The NERC and CEH trademarks and logos ('the Trademarks') are registered trademarks of NERC in the UK and other countries, and may not be used without the prior written consent of the Trademark owner. Public water supply systems are designed to maintain water supply through 21 extended periods of dry weather without excessive cost or environmental 22 damage. During a drought, water suppliers can take further measures to 23 enhance supplies or reduce demand. The introduction of drought measures is 24 usually formalised in a drought plan, but there is often little evidence that the 25 plan will prove successful during a range of feasible droughts. As the climate 26 changes, recent hydrological data may be a poor guide to future drought, and 27 planned actions may prove insufficient to maintain adequate water supplies. 28 29 This paper describes a method for testing the resilience of water company 30 drought plans to droughts that are outside recent hydrological experience. 31
Introduction 53 54
Public water supply systems are designed to smooth the natural variability of 55 climate and hydrological response so that a reliable water supply can be 56 maintained through a very wide range of weather conditions. It is generally 57 neither practical or affordable to provide unlimited water through any possible 58 drought, so water supply systems are usually planned to meet a design 59 standard. The standard may be expressed as a return period: for example, a 60 system may be designed to maintain supplies without restriction through a 61 drought with a return period of 1 in 50 years. This is analogous to the 62 approach widely used for flood scheme design (for example, MAFF 2001) but 63 its application to extended droughts presents a number of difficulties. 64
Droughts can be classified by their magnitude (dryness) and duration, but the 65 sequencing of drier and wetter periods within a drought can be very important 66 for the performance of water supply systems. This means that two droughts 67 with the same metrics (return period, duration, magnitude) could lead to 68 different outcomes in the same water supply system. Short droughts (perhaps 69 six to nine months) usually present few problems for water supply: long 70 droughts lasting a year or more are much more testing because they usually 71 include dry winters, which reduce the replenishment of groundwater and 72 reservoirs, placing them under greater stress in the following summer. 
England. 82 83
The paucity of reliable data on historical long droughts and the lack of 84 experience of the way that a given system will respond means that all water 85 supply planning is subject to a degree of uncertainty. The design standard will 86 never be completely unambiguous: if a system is designed against a specific 87 historic drought, system performance during equivalent, but different, future 88 droughts cannot be guaranteed. If the system is designed against a synthetic 89 drought of a calculated magnitude and duration, performance during real 90 droughts will not be certain. In addition, there remains the possibility of a 91 future drought that is beyond the design standard of the system. Further, as 92 the climate changes, past droughts may become an increasingly poor guide to 93 future drought: as global temperatures rise, evapotranspiration is expected to 94 increase almost everywhere (Bates et al 2008) , which is likely to have the 95
greatest impact on low flows (Kay and Davies 2008). Climate change 96
projections for the UK suggest significant decreases in average summer 97 rainfall through the 21 st century (Murphy et al 2009) . Modelling the persistence 98 of long droughts remains a problem for global climate models, but studies 99 suggest that short droughts with a duration of 6 to 18 months will increase in 100 frequency as the climate changes (Burke et al 2010) . together, the two sets of plans are intended to make sure that water suppliers 115 are ready for the next drought, whenever it starts. 116
117
The theoretical basis for linking long-term water supply plans with short-term 118 drought management plans is sensible and reflects good practice 119 internationally (Wilhite 1991 , Wilhite et al 2000 . However, this theoretical 120 strength does not guarantee that water supply systems will operate optimally 121 through future droughts. There are two main areas of uncertainty: the 122 resilience of the system itself to future droughts, and the appropriateness and 123 timeliness of the actions in the plan. 124
125
It is likely that future droughts will be different from those of the twentieth 126 century on which this system is based: for example, in the twentieth century,droughts in England and Wales typically lasted no more than two years, while 128 several nineteenth century droughts were of much longer duration, principally 129 as a result of clustering of periods of below average winter rainfall ( This paper tests the water supply and drought planning system on two 136 example supply systems. A novel approach engages water supply managers 137 directly in the testing, asking them to respond to a developing drought without 138 prior knowledge of its magnitude or duration. In taking this approach, it is 139 recognised that the water supply system consists not only of physical 140 infrastructure but also includes the institutions involved in managing water 141 supply and the people who act in this system both as managers and users of 142 water (Sofoulis 2005) . The paper describes the testing methodology (section 143 2), the characterisation of appropriate long droughts (section 3), water supply 144 system modelling (section 4), the interactive workshops (section 5) and 145 findings from the study (section 6). We draw on case studies from the UK, but 146 the methods described are relevant to a wide range of water supply systems 147 in other parts of Europe and the rest of the world. 148
Methodology and selection of case studies 151
This study assesses the resilience of the entire water supply system to 153 drought, considering both the physical infrastructure and the adaptive actions 154 that water supply managers and water users take during a drought. Water 155 supply system simulation models are often used to test system operation, but 156 can only reflect the rules that are built into the model. While some models are 157 very flexible and allow for complex operational rules, this approach assumes 158 that these rules can be designed fully before the drought and that they will be 159 followed perfectly. Experience from previous droughts (e.g. Doornkamp et al 160
1980, Environment Agency 2006) shows that flexibility in decision-making is 161
an important part of successful drought management. It is also clear that 162 factors beyond objective hydrological measures of the state of the water 163 supply system can be important in determining the actions that are taken. For 164 example, it is hard to introduce demand saving measures during even a brief 165 wet interlude in an otherwise dry year, and some water companies may be 166 nervous about the juxtaposition of customer restrictions and the reporting of 167 financial results. 168
169
The approach described here addresses the complexity of drought 170 management by allowing management intervention in the supply system. 171
Effective water supply management contributes to the robustness of the 172 supply system: good management should help to delay or avoid entirely the 173 worst effects of drought, while poor management may hasten supply failure 174 and environmental damage. 175
In many respects this approach is similar to a traditional modelling approach 177 to water supply system optimisation. Appropriate hydrological data is 178 assembled (section 3), a suitable system simulation model is built and tested 179 (section 4), system performance metrics are chosen, and simulation model 180 runs are carried out to test system performance (section 5). In this study, 181 though, the model runs consist not only of computer simulations but also 182 include month by month interventions from the people involved in managing 183 the system. 184
185
For this study two case studies were selected to test the resilience of different 186 types of water supply systems to long drought. The criteria applied in the 187 choice of the two study areas were: 188
189
• to consider sites that demonstrated different hydrological 190 characteristics and consequently different responses to long droughts; 191
192
• to include water resources zones with reservoirs with a different 193 balance of pumped storage and natural inflows; 194
195
• the availability of good quality, long time series of hydrological data and 196 effective system models; and 197
198
• co-operation from water companies to make sure that drought 199 management interventions could be represented accurately. between Offord and Denver has been constructed (figure 2). For detailed 317 reconstruction of daily river flows at Offord, more work would be necessary. 318
One problem is that summer Denver flows are often zero, as downstream of 319
Offord water leaves the main channel and enters the low-lying Fens. It would 320 not usually be possible to pump water into Grafham during these periods, 321 because of the abstraction licence conditions, so errors in very low flows are 322 less important in reservoir simulation. The identification of appropriate long 323 droughts below uses the reconstructed Denver (Ely Ouse) record. 324
Identification of long droughts using drought metrics 327
There is an extensive range of existing drought indicators reported across the 329 literature (Hisdal et al. 2004 provide a review of some of the widely used 330 drought characterisation techniques) and no single methodology for assessing 331 drought severity is likely to reflect the full range of drought impacts. In this 332 section three separate indicators, which capture drought severity in different 333 ways, are used to examine long droughts in the study catchments. 334
335
A simple, widely used technique for examining drought sequences is relative 336 ranking of n-month rainfall or runoff deficiencies. Table 2 catchments. An alternative approach, which applies a different Q70 threshold 359 for each month of the year and thus allows multi-season droughts to be 360 captured, was used in this study (Table 3) . For the Ely Ouse, only the top two 361 events extend over more than two years, but there are five droughts which 362 had 18-months below the monthly-varying Q70 threshold, four of which were 363 before 1910. On the Exe, most of the events are short duration, generally 364 within-year, deficiencies, as the higher flow variability in this catchment 365 prevents long-duration deficiencies from developing. Ouse catchment. Generally, the extended periods of groundwater deficiency 386 correspond to the long droughts identified using runoff records. The impacts 387 of long dry spells on groundwater levels is clear -in the record up to 1914, 388 levels were consistently below average, and protracted deficiencies are in 389 evidence through the record (e.g. in the early 1920s, throughout the 1940s). 390 391
Selection of long drought episodes for analysis 392 393
The long droughts identified in section 3.3 for the Ely Ouse and Exe generally 394 correspond to major drought episodes in England and Wales from 1850, as 395 characterised in Table 2 of Marsh et al (2007) . Differences in the relative 396 rankings of events between the two catchments partly reflect the regional 397 nature of some of the major droughts. For example, 1887 -1888 ranks highly 398 on the Exe, but does not feature in the Ely Ouse 
P is calculated according to abstraction licence conditions. In both cases 507 these define a minimum flow that must be left in the river (often called the 508 "minimum residual flow") and a maximum pumping volume. 509
510
Input data for this simple model is: 511
• river flow -a monthly time series for the duration of the simulation 512
• demand -a sequence of 12 monthly values representing current 513 demand, repeated through the simulation 514
• reservoir capacity, initial volume and start date 515
• pumping conditions -maximum pumping rate and abstraction licence 516 conditions. 517
518
In addition, the user interface allows a variety of interventions to be specified 519 dynamically during the simulation. These interventions can be on demand or 520 supply. Demand interventions reduce demand by a specified amount: for 521 example, this could be the saving from extra leakage control or demand 522 restrictions such as hosepipe restrictions. Supply interventions provide extra 523 water either to put into the reservoir or to meet demand directly, reducing the 524 demand on the reservoir. Combinations of supply and demand interventions 525 allow the effect of all possible drought measures to be simulated. 526
527
Model outputs were validated against yields provided by the water companies 528 by simulating reservoir behaviour over the period of record used to calculate 529 yield (see, for example, Watts (2010) for a discussion of approaches to the 530 calculation of yield). Good agreement was found, although small 531 discrepancies were observed due to use of a monthly time step compared to 532 the daily time step used in water companies' calculation of yield. In the 533
Wimbleball model the use of a monthly time step produced a slightly smaller 534 reservoir drawdown than observed in reality. To compensate for this target 535 demands were set slightly higher than normal in the workshop to produce a 536 more realistic drought response. 537
538
For reservoirs, drought measures are typically associated with drought trigger 539 curves: these provide a guide for the reservoir manager on the introduction of 540 different measures. These curves are incorporated in the model but do not 541 trigger action automatically: thus the reservoir manager can decide when to 542 take different actions, which can be introduced before or after the trigger 543 curve is breached. 544 545
Drought workshop 546 547
Testing the complete water resource system requires an exercise that allows 548 people to interact with a water supply system model and take decisions that 549 alter the subsequent state of the system. Exercises are commonly used in 550 emergency planning, often in a cycle that involves planning, training and then 551 performing an exercise to test the plan and the response of the participants 552 (Perry 2004 ). The aim of this study was to test the system rather than to train 553 the individuals involved. Using experienced system managers meant that 554 further training was not necessary. 555
556
The scenario exercises used in this project are based on a strategy game 557 approach described by Toth (1994) and Toth & Hizsnyik (2008) . Strategy 558
games have been applied in many different situations including military 559 strategies, corporate strategic planning and forecasting, public policy and 560 disaster preparedness to bring together and assess knowledge from a 561 number of fields identifying possible responses to complex management 562 problems and how policy might need to be restructured. Although they are 563 inevitably a simplification of reality they provide a way to integrate intangible 564 and non-quantifiable factors into strategic planning. Strategy games are 565 typically undertaken in workshop settings, allowing a facilitator to develop a 566 view of the plausibility of the scenario from the participants' perspective, 567 understand the difficulties and issues arising throughout the decision making 568 process and to explore where both the different practitioners' understanding of 569 the situation differs and where that of the practitioner differs from the 570 researcher (Ringland, 1998) . 571
572
Droughts are an unusual form of emergency, in that their start is not usually 573 noticed and their onset and development is very slow (Wilhite et al 2005) . Arelatively simple version of a strategy game, which could be executed within a 575 day, was therefore chosen. In this exercise the participants respond to 576 emerging drought situation data, focusing on how this would affect decision 577 making. Even this relatively simple approach requires detailed preparation so 578 that the drought scenarios are plausible for the people playing the game. This 579 approach also requires participants to be knowledgable about drought 580 planning procedures and familiar with their role in drought management. 581
582
Participants for the workshops were drawn from the two water companies 583 (operating the system), the Environment Agency (responsible for 584 environmental management and much of the regulatory regime) and Defra, 585 the Government department with overall responsiblity for drought 586 management in England. To make the workshop manageable, only a few 587 representatives of each organisation could be present. This meant that some 588 aspects of drought management had to be assumed: for example, water 589 companies were represented by people with overall responsibility for drought, 590 but who would not necessarily have detailed knowledge of the operation of 591 individual water treatment works. Some important stakeholders were excluded 592 from the workshops and their responses had to be estimated by other 593 participants: these included non-governmental organisations (NGOs) and 594 individual water users. 595
596
Simple water resource reservoir spreadsheet models were developed for the 597 case study areas based on information provided by the water companies 598 (section 4). Additional hydrological information was also provided including 599 rainfall, groundwater levels and river flows. Three to six month projections of 600 possible future state based on repeats of twentieth century events were 601 presented to aid decision-making. The data (on a graph and a spreadsheet) 602 appeared on a screen that everyone in the room could see and the time step 603 was operated manually so participants were able to 'pause' the model in order 604 to explore and capture a decision point. • annual reviews of the ability to manage the drought situation and future 614 concerns; 615
• scenario debriefs (summary and discussion after each of the two drought 616 scenarios); and 617
• overview of the day. 618
619
The different levels of evaluation gave the participants an opportunity to 620 reflect on the performance of the water companies, Defra and the 621 Environment Agency at critical points throughout the droughts and to discuss 622 lessons learned. The aim of the overview of the day was to draw out the main 623 issues with regards to drought management. This included putting thescenarios in the context of existing management plans and determining 625 whether these were sufficient or if there were some changes that could be 626 made to make the management process more efficient and effective in the 627 event of a long drought. This also provided an opportunity to discuss the 628 strengths and weaknesses of the scenario game and how plausibly it 629 represented the real world. 630 631 632
Outcomes and experiences 633 634
The main interventions required for each drought are shown in Table 5 635 (Wimbleball) and Table 6 (Grafham). In all of the droughts tested, a wide 636 range of drought measures was necessary to maintain reservoir levels: in the 637 most testing drought in each system, these measures were essential to avoid 638 reservoir failure, defined as the reservoir emptying. In the early stages of 639 drought, demand interventions were introduced. As the drought progressed, 640 measures to take more water from the environment were used. As the 641 drought continued, water companies turned to engineering options such as re-642 using abandoned sources and temporary water transfers between 643
catchments. 644
For Wimbleball, the main feature of these droughts was the very rapid rate of 646 drawdown of reservoir levels compared to recent experience. Drought triggers 647
were passed very rapidly through spring and early summer, with the result 648 that hosepipe bans were followed very quickly by further interventions toaugment supply. In both droughts, significant extra abstraction was needed 650 for two to three months, though expert opinion from regulators and the water 651 company agreed that this water would be available. Demand was reduced by 652 almost 20%, through a combination of water efficiency campaigns, garden 653 watering restrictions, restrictions on commercial water use, and additional 654 leakage control. 655
656
For Grafham, the first drought was no more severe than those experienced in 657 the twentieth century, but continued for four years. The water company used 658 hosepipe bans to restrict garden watering, but avoided restrictions on 659 commercial water use. Extra abstraction from the Ouse at Offord (under a 660 drought order) maintained reservoir levels. In the second drought, reservoir 661 levels dropped more rapidly than experienced in the twentieth century. 662
Restrictions on commercial water use were introduced, and in the later years 663 of the drought, abandoned water sources were reintroduced, as well as a 664 scheme to pump water upstream from the Fens to the Offord intake. This 665 scheme was planned but not implemented in the 1976 drought, but is not 666 included in the current drought plan. In this second drought, demand 667 reductions were also almost 20%, reflecting similar views from both 668 companies on the scope for managing demand during severe droughts. Total 669 interventions at Grafham represented a smaller proportion of reservoir 670 deployable output than at Wimbleball, but were in place for much longer, 671 reflecting the much slower response of the Ouse catchment. 672
In many ways it is reassuring that both water companies could find options to 674 make these supply systems operate through these extended droughts. This 675 suggests that the system of water supply plans and drought plans provides an 676 effective combination of measures that can cope with droughts longer than 677 those of the twentieth century. It is probable that this conclusion could have 678 been reached simply by simulation modelling, without the interactive 679 workshop: it would be easy to programme a simulation model to introduce 680 increasingly difficult interventions automatically as reservoir levels drop. The 681 real strength of this study was in examining the different circumstances in 682 which interventions would be made, hence exposing the thought processes of 683 the different actors involved. 684
685
All participants agreed that the exercise proved valuable, making them 686 question assumptions that were built into existing drought plans. It was 687 particularly evident that droughts do not play out as neatly as the drought plan 688 might suggest. Early in a drought, water companies tended to be reluctant to 689 introduce demand measures such as restrictions on garden watering because 690 they were concerned that the drought could recede and the restriction would 691 damage customer relations. On the other hand, regulators saw these early, 692 relatively painless demand measures as both a signal that the water company 693 was taking drought seriously and an essential prerequisite either to further 694 demand restrictions with a more serious economic and social impact or to 695 supply measures that could damage the environment. During a real drought, 696 such debates can be both acrimonious and divisive: in both exercises, thediscussion allowed all participants to gain an improved understanding of 698 alternative perspectives on the same problem. 699
700
Both water supply systems were tested with droughts more severe than those 701 recently experienced. In both cases, water company managers introduced 702 interventions that were not included in the drought plan, although the water 703 Water companies tend to rely on trigger curves based on reservoir levels 724 (figure 4) to prompt action. In some types of drought these static trigger 725 curves may lead to unnecessarily delayed action: in one case, we found that a 726 reservoir level dropped through the trigger curves so quickly that there was 727 little time for interventions to take effect. Actions based only on reservoir level 728 may fail to react properly to unusual circumstances such as very rapid 729 reservoir drawdown: water companies could investigate multivariate triggers 730 that include the rate of reservoir drawdown as well as the absolute level. impacts. Understanding these costs would allow water resources planners to 758 decide whether it might be better to change system design standards to avoid 759 such damage, or whether the current approach is an appropriate response to 760 low probability, high impact droughts. Given the complexities and cost of this approach, it will probably not be 827 possible to apply it to every water supply system in England and Wales. to respond to a range of droughts. This paper demonstrates that the 846 experience can be positive for all participants: exposing drought plans toscrutiny in this way should not frighten water suppliers but should be seen as 848 an opportunity to improve plans and participation. Water suppliers should 849 build on the results to refine or recast their plans, with the confidence that the 850 resulting plan will provide an improved response to the next drought. The 851 findings should also be used in the preparation of long-term water resources 852 plans, helping to identify options that improve water supply system resilience. 853
This will prove useful in preparing for climate change: a system that is resilient 854 now should be able to cope better with future climatic conditions. Widespread impacts in the south west. Low river levels on the Kenwyn, water scarcity reported in Torquay. Poor water quality: the Exe at Exeter described as "little better than a sewer" (Symons, 1888) 1901 -1907 Two notable 3-year deficiencies (1901 -1903; 1904 -1907 
